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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple theoretical model to identify the main
determinants of intergenerational occupational mobility with an ap-
plication to Italian data. We assume that occupational mobility is
described by a Markov matrix and that three factor affect the occu-
pational choice of an individual: the income incentives of each occu-
pation, the family background and the occupational structure.
The empirical application of the proposed model to a sample of
Italian families describes Italy as a less mobile country, and in partic-
ular we show that occupational mobility decreases for children born
between 1966 and 1976. This result is due to the worsening of oppor-
tunities. The estimate of three synthetic indexes confirms the decease
of mobility.
Classificazione JEL: C01; C22; J60; J62
Keywords: Markov Matrix, Occupational Mobility, Opportunities,
Mobility Indexes
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I. Introduction
Intergenerational economic mobility, one the stylized fact both in economics
and sociology, refers to the correlation between parents and children’s socio-
economic status. High correlation means low mobility, and, in general, low
mobility is associated to higher inefficiency (most talented individuals are not
allocated in the best positions) and higher injustice (initial positions and not
individual efforts decide your welfare). There is a large body of research on in-
tergenerational economic mobility in most developed countries as well as some
developing countries.
Starting from Becker and Tomes 1979, Solon 1992 and Zimmerman 1992,
the seminal works in this literature, numerous economists and sociologists analyze
intergenerational mobility from different point of view.
The majority of these studies measures economic mobility using an index, the
intergenerational elasticity (IGE), or the closely associated correlation coefficient
(Becker and Tomes 1986, Piraino 2007, Bjorklund and Jantti 2009 and Corak
and Piraino 2010). These indexes are synthetic measures of the correlation
between socio-economic status of two subsequent generations, therefore, they
do not provide any information on the processes lying behind such correlations
(Franzini et al 2013). An alternative method to measure economic mobility is
represented by the estimate ofMarkov matrix. The value added ofMarkov matrix,
and then of the transition matrix, is that it offers a more detailed depiction of
intergenerational mobility. It provides a picture of the movement of individuals
among the specified classes. Moreover, transition matrix lets one develop easily
interpretable mobility measures (see Bartholomew 1973, Shorrocks 1978 and
Formby et al 2004).
The measurement of mobility is widely debated in the literature, but less at-
tention is dedicated to the identification of the main determinants of intergenera-
tional mobility. From a socio-political point of view, the research of determinants
of mobility is essential to design effective social policy measures. Though focused
on alleviating social and economic inequalities, the social policy of a country tend
o reproduce stratification in terms of power, class and other forms of inequality
(Eberharter 2013. In this paper we propose a simple theoretical model to identify
the determinants of intergenerational occupational mobility with an application
to Italy.
Why occupational mobility? Socio-economic status can by measured by differ-
ent variables, the most common are social class, occupational status and income
(see, e.g., Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Cobalti and Schizzerotto 1994, Checchi
et al 1999, Solon 2002, Piraino 2007, Bjorklund and Jantti 2009, Franzini et al
2013 and Corak 2013). We use the occupational status, defined as the highest
occupation got by parents and children1, because it allows to take into account
1Bjorklund and Jantti 2000 summarize some of the relative merits of occupation for the
measurement of intergenerational mobility, and discuss scenarios in which it provides very
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both several key aspects of background, i.e. individual position in the social
scale, his or her prestige, relation capital and the capacity to influence important
economic decisions, and the changes in the occupational structure (Prais 1955,
Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Breen 2004, Granovetter 2005 and Long and
Ferrie 2013).
Many studies on mobility concerns United States, Scandinavian countries,
Germany or Canada. There is less evidence for Italy, as for other southern Euro-
pean countries, and probably this is due to the lack of long panels (Cervini-Pla
2014).
The work of Checchi et al 1999 is one of the first analysis about mobility in
Italy. They compare Italy and United states concluding that Italy has lower levels
of mobility than the US despite having lower levels of inequality. Also Mocetti
2007 finds evidence of a stronger persistence among sons’ income distribution, in
paricular among the upper quantile, and this highlights the inadequacy of the
institutional setting in guaranteeing opportunities of upwards mobility for indi-
viduals from low-income families. Finally, Piraino 2007 provides an analysis of
the degree of intergenerational mobility in Italy. He estimates the intergenera-
tional income elasticity and shows that mobility is limited.
This paper integrates this strand of literature. We, first, present the theoret-
ical model to identify the determinants of occupational mobility, and then, we
show the results for Italy.
According to our model the occupational status of each individual is the result
of the interaction between three different channels: the income incentives, the
opportunities and the occupational structure. The income incentives are the set
of characteristics of each occupational class which determines the individual will
to move to a particular class. Dardanoni et al 2006 discuss that all individual’s
actions that affect his or her occupational status represent the effort, and the
equality of opportunity holds only if the occupational status of children depends
on their own efforts. Regarding the opportunities, they are factors reflecting both
individual skills and family background, i.e. his or her native abilities, education,
but also parents’ education and social connection. Dardanoni et al 2006 denote
them as circumstances.
The last channel that affects children’s occupational status is the occupational
structure, that is exogenous changes, related to circumstances, in the labour
market that necessarily generate mobility (Prais 1955 and Bjorklund and Jantti
2000).
Considering an economy with only two occupational classes (Working and
Lower Middle and Upper Middle Capitalist class), we discuss how each determi-
nant affects occupational mobility. We assume that occupational mobility can be
described by a Markov matrix and we deduce three synthetic indexes to measure
the overall occupational mobility, proposed by Shorrocks 1978, the opportunities,
different results from those where intergenerational mobility is measured by income.
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and the incentives for children to not change their occupational class respectively.
From an empirical point of view, the model is estimated on data available
from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried on by the
Bank of Italy. We partition the sample into three Cohorts on the base of year of
birth of the head of household (1947−56, 1957−66 and 1967−76). We show that
occupational mobility decreases over time, in particular occupational mobility is
low for the youngest cohort, and the changes in the occupational structure seems
to lead to an increase in the downward mobility. Finally the estimate of the
model’s parameters suggests that the decrease of occupational mobility is due to
the decrease of opportunities for the Working and Lower Middle class to move
upward.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II. presents the theoretical model
for occupational mobility analysing the three determinants and discusses the syn-
thetic mobility indexes. Section III. is devoted to the empirical analysis on Italy,
and to a brief analysis of the relationship between income inequality and mobility.
Section IV. concludes.
II. A Model of Occupational Mobility
In the following we propose a simple model of occupational choice to identify
the crucial determinants of the occupational mobility of a society: i) the social
prestige and/or income incentives to choose one occupation instead of another
(see, e.g., Corak 2013); ii) the different opportunities generally related to family
background and socio-economic environment of individuals (see, e.g., Becker and
Tomes 1979 and Cap. 3 in Corak 2004); and, finally, iii) the occupational
structure, i.e. the possibility of occupation given by the production side of
economy (see, e.g., Prais 1955).
Consider an economy with two classes of occupations denoted by theWorking
and Lower Middle (WLM) class, and the Upper Middle and Capitalist (UMC)
class2.
The life-time (indirect) utility of individual i, Ui, only depends on her occu-
pation, i.e.:
Ui =
{
Wi, if individual belongs to WLM class;
Πi, if individual belongs to UMC class.
(1)
Assume that life-time utility in each class has a stochastic component; in partic-
ular:
logWi ∼ N
(
µWLM ; σ
2
WLM
)
; (2)
2We limit the theoretical model only to two classes for simplicity reasons. The extension to
more than two classes is straightforward from the theoretical point of view, but it does not add
any additional insights of the phenomenon, and the increase in the model’s parameters make
the results of the empirical application less clear.
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log Πi ∼ N
(
2θiµUMC; σ
2
UMC
)
, (3)
where N (·) is the Gaussian distribution, with 0 ≤ µWLM ≤ µUMC , σ2WLM ≤
σ2UMC , and θi ∈ [0, 1]. θi is an idiosyncratic factor that reflects both individual
skills and family background, i.e. her native abilities, education, but also parents’
education and social connections (the “circumstances” in Dardanoni et al 2006)3.
An individual decides to belong to UMC class if and only if :
E [Πi] ≥ E [Wi] + σ
RP , (4)
where σRP is the risk premium depending on the attitude towards risk of indi-
vidual i. Assuming that individual i is risk-adverse or risk-neutral, σRP ≥ 0, and
not decreasing in σ2UMC/σ
2
WLM , Condition (4) becomes:
2θiµUMC ≥ µWLM + σ
RP
(
σ2UMC
σ2WLM
)
⇒ θi ≥
µWLM + σ
RP
(
σ2UMC
σ2WLM
)
2µUMC
≡ λ; (5)
given θi, λmeasures the probabilty mass of indiviuals that decide to move towards
UMC class on the base of the income incentives of each occupation. A high
level of λ means a lower probability to move upward.
As regards the opportunities determined by family background and social
environment of individual i, we assume that if her parents belong to WLM class,
the probability distribution of θi is giving by:
f(θi|WLM) ∼ U (0, θ
max) , (6)
where U (0, θmax) means a uniformly distributed random variable in the range
[0, θmax], with θmax ≤ 1; otherwise if her parents belong to UMC class, the prob-
ability distribution of θi is giving by:
f(θi|UMC) ∼ U
(
θmin, 1
)
, (7)
with θmin ≥ 0.
Figure 1: A Comparison between opportunities of individuals whose parents
belong to different occupational classes.
0
1
θ
min
θ
max
Opportunities for children of WLM class
Opportunities for children of UMC class
θi
1
θmax
1
1−θmin
3θi is assumed to be known by individual i. This assumption makes irrelevant to know the
probability distribution of it.
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Figure 1 shows the different opportunities for individuals whose parents belong
to different occupational classes. A higher θmax tends to favour a change in
occupational class for individuals whose parents are in WLM class. The same
applies with a lower θmin for individuals whose parents are in UMC class.
When θmax < λ and θmin > λ no changes in occupational classes should be
observed. When θmax < λ and θmin < λ, only individuals whose parents belong
to UMC class change their class; hence in the long run all individuals will be
doomed to belong to WLM class. The opposite happens when θmax > λ and
θmin > λ, with all individuals in the UMC class in the long run.
The condition to observe a change for both classes are therefore given by:
θmax > λ; (8)
and
θmin < λ, (9)
Under Assumptions (8) and (9) the occupational mobility of a society is com-
pletely described by the following Markov matrix Q4:
Fathers\Children WLM UMC
WLM
λ
θmax
θmax − λ
θmax
UMC
λ− θmin
1− θmin
1− λ
1− θmin
The first element in the main diagonal of Q, λ/θmax, represents the probability of
a child with a father in WLM class to belong to WLM class given the probability
distribution (6) and her incentives to belong to WLM class reported in Condition
(5), i.e.:
Pr [θi ≤ λ|WLM ] =
λ
θmax
. (10)
Similarly the second element of the main diagonal of Q, (1− λ) /
(
1− θmin
)
,
represents the probability of a child with a father in UMC class to belong to
UMC class given the probability distribution (7) and her incentives to belong to
UMC class reported in Condition (5).
The first out-of-diagonal element, (θmax − λ) /θmax, is given by:
Pr [θi > λ|WLM ] = 1−Pr [θi ≤ λ|WLM ] = 1−
λ
θmax
=
θmax − λ
θmax
. (11)
4
λ
θmax
>
1− λ
1− θmin
guarantees thatQ is a monotone Markov transition matrix (see Dardanoni
1995)
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Social mobility, measured by Q, determines also the shares of individuals in the
two classes in the long run. In particular, the equilibrium distribution implied by
Q is given by5:
piQ =
[
1
1 + γ(θmin, θmax, λ)
,
γ(θmin, θmax, λ)
1 + γ(θmin, θmax, λ)
]
. (12)
where
γ =
(θmax − λ)(1− θmin)
θmax(λ− θmin)
; (13)
the first (second) element of piQ represents the equilibrium probability masses of
WLM (UMC) class. Higher θmin and/or θmax results in a lower equilibrium mass
of WLM class (∂γ/∂θmin > 0 and ∂γ/∂θmax > 0), while a higher λ leads to the
opposite outcome, a higher equilibrium mass of WLM class (∂γ/∂λ < 0)6.
II.A. Measures of Occupational Mobility
Heuristically the complement to 2 of the trace of Q defines a measure of
occupational mobility (a lower trace corresponding to a higher mobility)7. Under
Assumptions (8) and (9) we have:
IS = 2− tr(Q) = 2−
λ(1− θmin − θmax) + θmax
θmax(1− θmin)
; (16)
where IS ∈ [0, 2] (0 minimum social mobility, and 2 maximum). As expected
∂IS/∂θ
max > 0 and ∂IS/∂θ
min < 0, i.e. occupational mobility increases with θmax
and decreases with θmin.
5See Bartholomew 1973 for more details.
6To identify λ, θmax and θmin we have to solve the following system of three equations (notice
that we have three parameters and three independent equation because the sum of the elements
in each row is equal to one): 

λ
θmax
= q11
1− λ
1− θmin
= q22
(θmax − λ)(1 − θmin)
θmax(λ− θmin)
= pi1
(14)
from which we get:
θmin =
(1− q11)pi1 − (1− q22)pi2
q22pi2 − pi1q11
, θmax = (q11θ
min+1+q11)
pi1
(1− pi1)q11
and λ = q11θ
max.
(15)
.
7A simple intuition of IS is to see it as the sum of the out of diagonal element of Q.
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Instead occupational mobility has an ambiguous relationship with λ. Higher λ
means less (upward) mobility for WLM children and higher (downward) mobility
for UMC children. Under the condition θmin+θmax < 1 the first effect prevails on
the second and IS decreases with λ. This should be the most plausible case be-
cause this would mean that the less upward mobility of lower social occupational
class WLM more than compensate the higher downward mobility of higher social
occupational class UMC (this is the case for Italy, see Section III.). Under the
Assumptions (8) and (9) the occupational mobility can be decomposed into two
components, the first related to incentives, and the second to opportunities.
Figure 2: Disentangle the occupational mobility due to incentives and oppor-
tunities.
0 θi
θ
min
θ
max 1
λ
A B C
D E F
In Figure 2 IS is measured by area (C+D)
8. Area (B+C) measures the prob-
ability to move upward for children with parents in WLM class independent of
incentives (i.e. the level of λ). Likewise Area (D+E) measures the probability to
move downward. Area (B+C+D+E) can therefore proxy for the socio-economic
opportunities of individuals, that is:
IOPP = 2−
θmin(1− θmin) + θmax(1− θmax)
θmax(1− θmin)
. (17)
IOPP reaches the highest value equal to 2 for θ
min = 0 and θmax = 1.
The difference IINC ≡ IOPP − IS, i.e. area (B+E) in Figure 2, measures the
incentives for children to not change their occupational class with respect their
parents; in particular
IINC =
λ− θmin
θmax
+
θmax − λ
1− θmin
; (18)
IINC is in the range [0, 1). Eqs.(16)-(18) therefore allows to disentangle the part
of occupational mobility due to incentives and to opportunities.
8Area C is equal to
(
1−
λ
θmax
)
, while area D is equal to
(
1−
1− λ
1− θmin
)
.
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II.B. Three Types of Societies
In this section we discuss three extreme types of Markov matrix, Q, corre-
sponding to three extreme cases of society.
1 Perfect Mobile Society (see Prais 1955): the probability of entering a par-
ticular class is independent of the class of one’s parents. In our model this
means θmin = 0 and θmax = 1, from which:
QPMS =
[
λ 1− λ
λ 1− λ
]
, (19)
and
piQPMS =
[
λ, 1− λ
]
. (20)
It is worth noting that Perfect Mobile Society does not imply the symmetric
mobility between classes; with λ = 1/2
QPMS =
[
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
]
, (21)
while with λ = 0
QPMS =
[
0 1
0 1
]
; (22)
however QPMS reported in (21) shows both downward and upward mobility, while
QPMS reported in (22) just upward mobility (notice that IS = 1 for both QPMS).
Accordingly in a Perfect Mobile Society IOPP = 2 and IINC = 1. A comparison
between QPMS in (21) and (22) highlights how between socio-economic mobility
and social welfare there is not a perfect correspondence: QPMS in (21) appears to
be Pareto-dominated by QPMS in (22) since the second one has the same mobility,
but all individuals are in UMC class in the equilibrium distribution.
2 Perfect Immobile Society : no movements between classes take place. In our
model this means θmin > λ and θmax < λ:
QPIS =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (23)
In this case IS = 0 and IOPP = IINC = 0 by definition.
3 Ex-Post-Minimum Inequality Society : class WLM is the absorbing class
in the equilibrium distribution. In our model this means θmin < λ and
θmax < λ, from which:
QEPMIS =

 1 0λ− θmin
1− θmin
1− λ
1− θmin

 , (24)
with
piQEPMIS =
[
1, 0
]
. (25)
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Since IS = 1 −
1− λ
1− θmin
we observe that a decrease in λ leads to an increase
in mobility but ex-post inequality is the same. We refer to this case as Ex-
Post-Minimum Inequality Society because all observations in the long-run will be
concentrated in the WLM class characterized by minimum variance. If θmin > λ
and θmax > λ, from which:
Q =
[
λ
θmax
θmax − λ
θmax
0 1
]
, (26)
with
piQ =
[
0, 1
]
. (27)
with IS = 1−
λ
θmax
. We can not refer to this case as Ex-Post-Minimum Inequality
Society since UMC class, where all observations will be concentrated in the long-
run, shows higher variance and then a higher level of inequality.
II.C. A Decomposition of the Observed Occupational Mobility
Prais 1955 discusses how the observed occupational mobility can be traces
to two types of forces related to i) occupational mobility due to the choices
of individuals (Prais denotes it as ”true” occupational mobility); and ii) the
occupational mobility due to occupational shifts, changes in the occupational
structure caused both by changes in the supply side and in differences in the
reproduction rates within each occupational class. Prais 1955 assumes that
observed transition matrix P is the result of the product of two Markov transition
matricesQ⊤ representing the true occupational mobility, andR⊤ representing the
occupational shifts.
Given the choices of individuals and the shares of observations at period t,
sUNt+1 = Q
⊤st would be the vectors of allocations of individuals to each occupa-
tional class if there were not any constraints from the supply side of economy
or different reproduction rates in each classes. The observed vector at period
t + 1 is generally different from sUNt+1. R reflects these possible differences due to
occupational shifts, i.e.:
st+1 = R
⊤sUNt+1 = R
⊤Q⊤st = P
⊤st (28)
In particular in our framework with just two classes:
R⊤ =
[
r11 r21
r12 r22
]
; (29)
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where r11 can be meant as the probability for individual i, who would aim to
belong to WLM class, to be in WLM class; r21 is the probability for individual
i, who would aim to belong to UMC class, to belong to WLM class because of
the occupational structure; r12 is the probability for individual i, who would aim
to belong to WLM class, to belong to UMC class, and r22 is the probability for
individual i, who would aim to belong to UMC class, to be in that class.
We observe two extreme situations:
1 No occupational shifts happened, i.e. st+1,WLM = st,WLM and st+1,UMC =
st,UMC; then:
RNOS =
[
1 0
0 1
]
; (30)
where no constraints are present in the individual choices.
2 Maximum occupational shifts happened, then:
RMOS =
[
0 1
1 0
]
; (31)
where maximum constraints are present in the individual choices.
In general we observe P, then to estimate Q from P we need R, and the estimate
of R is possible only imposing some identifying assumptions. Prais 1955 follows
a criterion of minimum occupational mobility to identify R: he proposes an
algorithm starting from the first class of fathers, and sequentially arriving to the
top one, which allocates children in each class minimizing the changes between
occupational classes with respect to their fathers class9. We instead estimate R
under the criterion of the jointly minimum occupational mobility, measured by
the opposite of the trace of R, subject to the observed occupational shifts, i.e.:
max
R
tr(R) subject to


st+1 = R
⊤st,∑k
j=1 rij = 1 ∀i = 1...k,
rij ≥ 0 ∀ij
(32)
Therefore we assume that individuals are able to realise their optimal choice
conditioned to the occupational structure. In addition to the situation where no
occupational shifts happened we have two other solutions to Problem 32:
3 Occupational shifts happened in favour of WLM class, i.e. st+1,WLM > st,WLM
and st+1,UMC < st,UMC; then:
R∗WLM =

 1 0st,UMC − st+1,UMC
st,UMC
st+1,UMC
st,UMC

 ; (33)
9See Appendix A for a numerical example.
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where some individuals choosing UMC class are constrained to belong to
WLM class.
4 Occupational shifts happened in favour of UMC class, i.e. st+1,WLM < st,WLM
and st+1,UMC > st,UMC; then:
R∗UMC =

st+1,WLMst,WLM
st,WLM − st+1,WLM
st,WLM
0 1

 ; (34)
where some individuals choosing WLM class are constrained to belong to
UMC class.
III. An Estimate of Occupational Mobility in Italy
Now we estimate the theoretical model presented in Section II. and the indexes
of mobility for a sample of heads of household born in the period 1947 − 1976.
In particular we partition the sample into three cohorts on the base of the year
of birth: the first cohort includes those heads of household born in the period
1947−1956 (Cohort I), the second one those born between 1957 and 1966 (Cohort
II) and the third one those born between 1967 and 1976 (Cohort III).
Section III.A. describes the dataset in more details, and Section III.B. contains
the estimates.
III.A. The Dataset
The dataset is build from a a nationally representative household survey car-
ried on by the Bank of Italy, the “Survey on Household Income and Wealth”
(SHIW ).
In particular we consider the last eight waves conducted in the period 1998-2012,
selecting all heads of household aged from 22 up to 65 (i.e born between 1947
and 1976). We focus on these waves because all heads of household are asked
to recall some characteristics of their parents, among which year of birth and
occupational status, indicatively referred to the same current age of the respon-
dent10. Following the standard approach in literature we measure occupational
mobility comparing occupational status of children and their fathers (see, Chec-
chi 1997 and Piraino 2007). We removed those heads of household not giving
informations on their fathers and the repeated observations due to longitudinal
component (panel) present in the waves (about 30% of households persists from
a wave and the next one). We get a sample of 11, 807 observations divided into
4, 015 in Cohort I, 4, 848 in Cohort II and 2, 944 in Cohort III.
10Asking to the respondent the occupational status of his or her parents at the same current
age we control for the life cycle component.
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III.B. The Estimate of Italian Occupational Mobility
In accordance to the theoretical model we define two occupational classes:
theWorking and Lower Middle (WLM) class and the Upper Middle and Capi-
talist (UMC) class. Following a large sociological literature we rank occupational
classes according to their social prestige, such as the Hope-Goldthorpe scale (see,
e.g., Goldthorpe and Hope 1974, and more recently Cap.12 in Giddens and Sut-
ton 2013). Hope-Goldthorpe scale mainly reflects the average income paid by
each occupation, but a number of other social criteria enter into its construction
(see Giddens and Sutton 2013 for more details).
The eight socio-economic classes of Hope-Goldthorpe scale are pooled into
WLM class which includes blue-collars, clericals and teachers; and UMC class
which consists of managers, member of profession, entrepreneurs and self-employment
workers (see Cap.12 in Giddens and Sutton 2013)11. According to the nine ISCO
classes, for both children and fathers, our two occupational classes correspond re-
spectively to: the first class (WLM) includes ISCO categories from 3 to 7 excepted
the 6 category; the second class (UMC) concerns ISCO categories from 1 to 2
and the 6th 12.
Table 1 contains the estimate of P (the observed total mobility), R and Q
matrices for each cohort. The overall persistence in occupational status between
generations, estimated by P, increased for WLM class and decreased for UMC
class (from Cohort I to Cohort III the probability to remain in WLM class in-
creased from 0.74 to 0.86, while the probability to remain in UMC class decreased
from 0.48 to 0.37)13. Accordingly the probability to move upward decreased from
Cohort I to Cohort III (the probability to move upward fom WLM class decreases
from 0.26 to 0.14), while the probability to move downward increased from 0.52
to 0.6314. The high persistence in the first class is also found by Pisati 2000 and
Di Pietro and Urwin 2003 even if our estimates give a even worse picture of this
phenomenon (0.85 vs 0.51 in Pisati 2000). This higher persistence is mainly due
to our inclusion in WLM class of blue-collar and office workers.
Looking atQ we observe that, also in this case, Cohort I and II are similar, but
Cohort III shows an increase of the persistence for WLM class. The comparison
between P andQ highlights that occupational shifts played a role only for Cohort
11In the questionnaire of Bank of Italy for children we refer to card B01: the first occupational
class corresponds to the answers 1 2, 3 and 12 (Blue-collar, Office worker, Teacher and Unem-
ployed), the second class corresponds to the answers 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Junior and senior Middle
Manager/Official/School Head and Magistrate, Member of Professions, Small Employer and
Own Account Worker). As regards fathers we refer to card A25 with the same classification.
12Franzini et al 2013 develop an analysis of occupational mobility using three categories
using the ISCO classes: managers, classes from 1 to 2, white-collars, classes from 3 to 5, and
blue-collars, classes from 6 to 9
13We can reject the null hypothesis of equality between all these transition probabilities at
the usual confidence level of 5%.
14We can reject the null hypothesis of equality between all these transition probabilities at
the usual confidence level of 5%.
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III. In particular the true persistence in UMC class is higher (0.37 vs 0.45), and
at the same time, the probability to move downward is lower (0.55 vs 0.63). This
result is due to the shifts in the occupational structure stressed by R (r22 << 1).
In particular, for Cohort IR shows a small upward bias for children whose fathers
are in WLM class suggesting that some of them are constrained to move towards
to the upper class (0.02%); for Cohort II holds the opposite, children whose
fathers are in UMC class are constrained to move downward. For Cohort III
the constraint to mobility employed by occupational structure is more evident:
0.24% of children with a father in UMC class are obliged to move downward.
Therefore the occupational shifts lead to an increase in the downward mobility
for the youngest cohort.
Table 2 reports the estimate of the parameters of the theoretical model pre-
sented in Section II.. From Cohort I to Cohort III λˆ increases (0.52 vs 0.56)
suggesting less income incentives for an individual in WLM class to move to
UMC class, and higher income incentives for an individual in UMC class to ac-
cess to WLM class. From Cohort I to Cohort III both θmin and θmax decreases
showing that increases the opportunities for UMC individuals to move downward
and decreases the opportunities to move upward for WLM individuals.
As expected θmin+ θmax < 1 for all cohorts implying that IS is decreasing in λ
(remind that higher λ means less incentives to upward mobility for children with
WLM parents). Moreover from Cohort I to Cohort III IOPP decreases confirming
the reduction of opportunities to change occupational class, and, finally, IINC
increases highlighting an increase of the incentives for children to remain in the
same class of their fathers15.
Table 1: Estimate of Markov matrices of socio-economic mobility for Cohort
I, II and III (1947− 56, 1957 − 66 and 1967 − 76).
P R Q
Cohort I WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort I WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort I WLM UMC N.Obs
WLM 0.74 0.26 2742 WLM 0.98 0.02 2742 WLM 0.74 0.26 2742
UMC 0.52 0.48 1273 UMC 0 1 1273 UMC 0.52 0.48 1273
N.Obs 2713 1302 4015 N.Obs 2713 1302 4015 N.Obs 2713 1302 4015
Cohort II WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort II WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort II WLM UMC N.Obs
WLM 0.77 0.23 3406 WLM 1 0 3406 WLM 0.77 0.23 3406
UMC 0.55 0.45 1442 UMC 0.02 0.98 1442 UMC 0.55 0.45 1442
N.Obs 3435 1413 4848 N.Obs 3435 1413 4848 N.Obs 3435 1413 4848
Cohort III WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort III WLM UMC N.Obs Cohort III WLM UMC N.Obs
WLM 0.86 0.14 2112 WLM 1 0 2112 WLM 0.85 0.15 2112
UMC 0.63 0.37 832 UMC 0.24 0.76 832 UMC 0.55 0.45 832
N.Obs 2308 636 2944 N.Obs 2308 636 2944 N.Obs 2308 636 2944
Notes: Columns 2-4 report the estimate of P; columns 6-8 report the estimate of R; and
columns 10-12 report the estimate of Q respectively.
Source: Our calculations based on SHIW (Bank of Italy).
15We can reject the null hypothesis of equality between the two values of each parameter at
the usual confidence level of 5%.
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Table 2: Estimate of λ, θmin, θmax, IS, IOPP and IINC .
Cohort λˆ θˆmin θˆmax IS IOPP INIC
I 0.52
(0.013)
0.010
(0.001)
0.70
(0.02)
0.78
(0.01)
1.68
(0.02)
0.90
(0.04)
II 0.55
(0.013)
0.008
(0.002)
0.71
(0.019)
0.78
(0.003)
1.71
(0.005)
0.93
(0.002)
III 0.56
(0.03)
0.001
(0.003)
0.67
(0.003)
0.72
(0.01)
1.67
(0.006)
0.95
(0.004)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; they are computed via a bootstrap proce-
dure with 1000 bootstraps (see Efron and Tibshirani 1993).
III.C. Occupational Mobility and Income Inequality
An emerging body of evidence suggests that more income inequality is present
and more likely is that family background plays a strong role in determining the
children’s outcome, and then lower intergenerational mobility (e.g., see Durlauf
1996 and Andrews and Leigh 2009). The OECD 2011 states that rising inequality
“can stifle upward social mobility, making it harder for talented and hard-working
people to get to rewards they deserve. Intergenerational earnings mobility is
low in countries with high inequality such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and
the United States, and much higher in the Nordic countries, where income is
distributed more evenly.”
Andrews and Leigh 2009 and Corak 2013 show that countries with greater
inequality tend to be countries with low intergenerational mobility. Krueger 2012
represents this negative relationship with what he has referred to as “The Great
Gatsby Curve”16. The empirical evidence discussed by Krueger 2012 and Corak
2013 shows Italy as a country with high inequality and low mobility.
In our model to investigated this relationship we compare the variance of the
life-time utility and the Gini index (used as measures of income inequality) and
the Shorrocks index (the measure of mobility) for each cohort17.
The variance of the life-time utility is derived from the model as follow:
σ2logUi = piWLMσ
2
WLM + piUMCσ
2
UMC + piWLMpiUMC
[(
1 + λ
2
)
µUMC − µWLM
]2
,
(35)
where piWLM and piUMC are the long-run distribution of observations in WLM
class and UMC class respectively18.
Contrary to the expectations, the model suggests a positive relationship be-
tween income inequality and mobility, and this result is confirmed by the empir-
16Krueger used this label for the first time during the speech “The Rise and Consequences
od Inequality” to the Centre for American Progress on January 12, 2012.
17We compute also the Gini index since it is robust to the outlier value and to the metrics.
18For the Shorrocks index see Section II.A.
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ical evidence. In fact, Table 3 shows that from Cohort II to Cohort III mobility
decreases (0.78 vs 0.72) as income inequality (0.74 vs 0.67)19.
Table 3: The Shorrocks and Gini index, and the Variance of life-time utility
in each Cohort.
Cohort I II III
IS 0.78 0.78 0.72
σ2logUi 0.74 0.74 0.67
IGini 0.33 0.31 0.29
The fact that mobility has not increased during a period in which inequality
of incomes has decreased may seem debatable, but it can not be. “Imagine that
all incomes are close to being equal, then mobility would be close to zero because
there would be so little to gain from getting a better job or working harder. And
by the same token social mobility might be very great in a society yet income
inequality also be very great” 20
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose a simple theoretical model to identify the main
determinants of occupational mobility. We also provide an application to Italy
using data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) for the
period 1979− 2008.
The theoretical model identifies three main determinants: the income in-
centives, a set of characteristics of each occupational class which induces the
individual will to move to a particular class, the opportunities related to his or
her native abilities, education, family background and to the socio-economic en-
vironment, and the changes in the occupational structure, exogenous factors
related to the supply side of the labour market. The latter represents a constraint
to the individual choice to change own occupational class.
The application to our sample describes Italy as a less mobile society in par-
ticular occupational mobility decreases for individuals born between 1967−1976.
The estimate of the model’s parameters suggests that the decrease of mobility
is mainly due to the decrease of opportunities for children with a father in the
Working and Lower Middle class.
19Gini index and variance are computed using the total income of each head of household.
In particular for each wave (1998-2012) we compute the two measures of inequality, and then
we calculate the geometric mean.
20http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2014/02/social-mobility-and-income-inequalityposner.
html
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Future research should be take into account the possibility to assume that
θi, the parameter measuring the opportunities, is not known by individual i.
Individual has only beliefs on θi depending on the socio-economic status of the
past generations and also on the genetic transmission of abilities.
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A The Numerical Example for the Decomposition of Observed Oc-
cupational Mobility.
To identify R (and therefore Q) we can make different assumption on the
allocation of children on each occupational class. We follow the criterion of min-
imum occupational mobility as in Prais 1955, but we measured it in terms of the
trace of the R matrix. Consider for example the following Markov and transition
matrices:
M =


15 33 35 83
33 55 17 105
58 0 54 112
106 88 106 300

 P =


0.18 0.40 0.42 83
0.32 0.52 0.16 105
0.52 0 0.48 112
106 88 106 300


The actual distribution of fathers (st) is written in the extreme right-hand col-
umn and the distribution of children (st+1) is written down in the bottom row.
Tables below show the two approaches (Prais and ours respectively) to obtain
the matrix representing the changes of the occupational structure:
CPRAIS =


83 0 0 83
23 82 0 105
0 6 106 112
106 88 106 300

 COURS =


83 0 0 83
11 88 6 105
12 0 100 112
106 88 106 300


The matrix R is than derived by dividing each row by the sum of the element in
it, i.e.:
RPRAIS =

 1 0 00.22 0.78 0
0 0.05 0.95

 ROURS =

 1 0 00.10 0.84 0.06
0.11 0 0.89


We interpret R as the matrix of the constraints to individual occupational choice
deriving from the occupational structure. Prais 1955 assumes that, if a child
can not remain in the same class of her father, she moves downward in a lower
occupational class with respect to that of her father. Unlike Prais, we assume
that, if the occupational structure limits individual choices, then individual can
move both downward and upward but minimizing the overall mobility.
